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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4194 
___________ 
 
In Re:  COSME ORDAZ, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Criminal No. 2:98-cr-00587-016) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
December 13, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit 
 
Judges  
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cosme Ordaz is a federal prisoner currently serving a 298-month sentence of 
incarceration.  We vacated the first sentence imposed by the District Court, see generally 
United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2005), but affirmed the second, see 
generally United States v. Ordaz, 227 F. App’x 170 (3d Cir. 2007); we also denied him a 
certificate of appealability in the collateral attack on his conviction and sentence.  See 
C.A. No. 11-1587 (order entered Oct. 17, 2011).   
 
  
2 
 
Ordaz now petitions for mandamus from this Court on the basis of two documents 
from the sentencing phase of his trial (ECF Nos. 627 and 772), both requesting 
“downward departures” based allegedly on poor conditions of pretrial confinement.1
 As Ordaz acknowledges, mandamus is “an appropriate remedy in extraordinary 
circumstances only.  . . .  A petitioner seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus must 
have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to 
issuance is clear and indisputable.”  
  
Ordaz contends that the motions were never ruled upon by the District Court, in violation 
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  He filed a “request for status report” below, and was told 
by the District Court that the case was now closed.  According to Ordaz, this state of 
affairs compels us to “vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to clarify the 
basis for its ruling.”  Pet. 4. 
Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), 
superseded in part by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (1997) (altering prisoner-account-statement 
procedure described in footnote 6 of Madden).  Nor is a mandamus proceeding a 
substitute for direct appeal.  See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506 (1979).  First, 
Ordaz does not actually demonstrate that the District Court failed to rule on the motions 
to which he refers; furthermore, the first of the two was filed pro se while he was 
represented by counsel, see United States v. Turner
                                              
1 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000). 
, 677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012), 
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and predated our decision to remand the case for resentencing.  The submissions 
themselves are not currently available on the District Court’s electronic docket, nor has 
Ordaz presented us with copies of them.  But ultimately, even if the District Court erred 
by failing to address Ordaz’s request for a departure, the time to raise this claim—and 
alleged Rule 32(i) errors are waivable, see United States v. Broxmeyer
 Thus, finding neither extraordinary circumstances nor an indisputable right, we 
will deny this petition for mandamus. 
, 699 F.3d 265, 
278–79 (2d Cir. 2012)—has long since passed.  Rule 32(i) governs procedures at 
sentencing, which took place some time ago.  Since then, Ordaz has pursued two direct 
appeals and a collateral attack, without raising the lingering, unresolved sentencing 
motions.  As the District Court correctly explained, his conviction and sentence are now 
final.  Mandamus cannot generally provide an alternative when a litigant has previously 
failed to raise available claims.  
